Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms correspond to the time-averaged payoffs, while the three and four-player terms arise from the adaptation of the morphs to their varying environment. Such multi-player (adaptive) terms can induce a stable polymorphism. The establishment of the polymorphism in partnership games [genetic selection] is accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population. Environmental impact on adaptation, selection and evolution is an important subject of biological research [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . The main scenario of environmental adaptation on the population level is polymorphism [1, 2, 3, 4] : two or more clearly different types of phenotype (morph) exist in one interbreeding population. The basic mechanisms of polymorphism are heterozygote advantage and inhomogeneous (frequency, space and/or time-dependent) environment [2, 4] . Polymorphism can be restricted to the phenotype level, or it may be controlled genetically by multiple alleles at a single locus , e.g., human ABO blood groups [4] . Here is one example of polymorphism related to a time-dependent environment [4, 5] . Forrest populations of the land snail Cepaea Nemoralis consist of three morphs having respectively brown, pink and yellow colored shells [4, 5] . The brown and pink morphs have an advantage over the yellow morph at the spring time, since the background color makes them less visible for predators [4, 5] ; the yellow morph has an advantage at summer and autumn on the yellow-green substrate. In addition, the yellow morph is more resistant to high and low temperatures [4, 5] . Thus different morphs have different advantage under different environmental conditions [4] .
A varying environment has roughly three dimensions: it may be time or/and space dependent, predictable vs stochastic, and fine vs coarse-grained [1] . The latter means that each individual within population sees mainly one fixed environment, which can change from one generation to another, for example. A fine grained environment changes many times during the life-time of each individual; see the above example of Cepaea and note that this snail lives seven to eight years [4, 5] .
Much attention was devoted to modeling polymorphism in various coarse-grained environments [1, 2, 6 7, 8, 9] . Fine-grained environments got less attention, since early theoretical results [1, 10] and the biological common sense [2] implied that non-trivial polymorphism scenarios are absent. One expects that in this case the organism sees (thus adapts to) the average environment [1, 2, 10] . However, recent experiments indicate that the evolving populations can adapt to time-varying aspects of their fine-grained environment [11, 12, 13] . In particular, they can respond to the environmental patterns other than the environmental mean [11] . Moreover, the total fitness during such an adaptation need not increase [13] . A proper theoretical model for such phenomena is still absent.
Here we present a theory for polymorphism in finegrained, time-periodic environment based on Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Our main method is the timescale separation in the replicator dynamics.
EGT describes interacting agents separated into several groups [7, 14] . The reproduction of each group is governed by its fitness, which depends on interactions between the groups. The most popular replicator dynamics approach to EGT describes the time-dependent frequency p k (t) of the group k, which is the number of agents N k in the group k, over the total number of agents in all n groups:
The fitness f k of the group k is a linear function of the frequencies [7, 14] :
where the payoffs a kl account for the interaction between (the agents from) groups k and l. The replicator dynamics [14] facilitates the (relative) growth of groups with fitness larger than the average fitness n l=1 p l f l :
Within game theory the groups correspond to strategies, while the pay-offs a kl describe interaction between two players: the probability p k of strategy k changes according to the average pay-off l a kl p l received by one player in response to applying the strategy k [7, 14] . There are several applications of EGT and replicator dynamics in biology: i) Animal (agent) contests, where the groups correspond to the strategies of agent's behavior during the contest, while p k is the probability by which an agent applies the strategy k [14] . The actual mechanism by which p k changes depends on the concrete implementation of the model (inheritance, learning, imitation, infection, etc). ii) Selection of genes, where p k is the frequency of one-locus allele k in panmictic, asexual, diploid population, and where a kl = a lk refers to the selective value of the phenotype driven by the zygote (kl) [7] . Then (1, 2) are the Fisher equations for the selection with overlapping generations [7, 14] . iii) The basic Lotka-Volterra equations of ecological dynamics can be recast in the form (2) and studied as replicators [14] . Within the replicator approach polymorphism means a stable state, where two or more p k are non-zero.
We consider a varying, but predictable environment, which acts on the phenotypes making a kl periodic functions of time with period 2π/ω [7, 15] :
There are well-defined methods to decide to which extent a varying environment is predictable for a given organism [9] . The oscillating payoffs can reflect the fact that different morphs (alleles, strategies) are dominating at different times. Let us assume that the environment varies fast [fine-graining]: the average change of the population structure over the environment period 2π/ω is small. We separate the time-dependent payoffs a kl (τ ) into the constant partā kl and the oscillating part a kl (τ ) with zero time-average¯ a kl ≡ 2π 0 dτ 2π a kl (τ ) = 0,
whereâ kl is defined to be the primitive of a kl with its time-average equal to zero.
Following the Kapitza method [17] , we represent p k as a slowly varying partp k plus ǫ k [p(t), τ ], which is smaller thanp k , fast oscillating on the environment time τ , and averaging to zero:
Here the average is taken over the fast time τ for a fixed slow time t. Note that the fast ǫ k depends on the slowp. Now put (4) into (2) and expand the RHS of (2) over ǫ:
where the summation over the repeated Greek indices, is assumed and ∂ α X ≡ ∂ ∂pα X. The fast factor ǫ i is searched for via expanding over and get for the fast terms:
whereâ = {â kl } is defined in (3). Once (7) is separated, the remainder in (6) is the evolution of slow termṡ
where the time-average is defined as in (5). Working out (8) and usingâ b = − ab we get again a replicator equatioṅ
where F k is the effective (already non-linear) fitness, and
Here we defined a
[s]
kl ≡ 1 2 (a kl + a lk ). Equations (9, 10) are our central result. Expectedly, the fast environment contributes the averaged payoffsā kl into F k . This is wellknown for any fine-grained environment [1] .
However, besides this averaged two-party interaction, each group k gets engaged into three-and four-party interactions with payoffs b klm and c klmn , respectively. Indeed, recalling our discussion after (2), we can interpret lm b klmplpm in (10) as the average pay-off received by one of three players upon applying strategy k. The terms with b klm and c klmn in (10) exist due to adaptation of the morphs to their environment: while the frequencies of the morphs fast oscillate on the environmental time, see (5), on longer times the population sees the fast environment as an effective many-player model. Note that the terms with b klm and c klmn need not be small as compared toā kl -terms, since the derivation of (9-11) applies forp k ≫ ǫ k , which can hold even forā kl → 0.
We get b klm = c klmn = 0 [due toâ kl a kl = 0], if only one a kl varies in time, or if all a kl oscillate at one phase: a kl = a(t)ξ kl , where ξ kl are constant amplitudes. Indeed, the adaptive terms [with b klm and c klmn ] are non-zero due to interference between the environmental oscillations of a kl and those of ǫ k , which are delayed over the environmental oscillations by phase π/2; see (7). This is why there is no interference if all a kl oscillate in phase. Thus for having the adaptive terms we need at least two morphs reacting on the environment differently, e.g., due to different delay times of reaction. For the adaptive terms we also need the frequency-dependent selection, e.g., they are absent
Euation (9) implies that the relative growth of two morphs at slow (long) times is determined by the effective fitness difference:
Thus in the stable fixed points of (9) the (effective) fitness of surviving morphs are equal to each other, while the fitness of non-surviving (p k → 0) morphs is smaller (Nash equilibrium) [14] . Another pertinent quantity, the (fast) time-averaged fitnessf k [p(t)] is the cumulative effect of the short-time replication intensities. Employing (4, 5, 7) we deduce that even when the adaptive terms are taken into account, these two quantities are equal
The overall long-time fitness of the population is characterized by the effective mean fitness p α F α , which is also equal to its time-averaged analog:
The contribution c αβγδpαpβpγpδ inp α F α nullifies due to
The mean fitness Φ is especially important for partnership games [genetic selection]: a ik (τ ) = a ki (τ ), since for the constant payoff situation in the replicator equation (2), Φ monotonically increases towards its nearest local maximum over the set of variablesp k (fundamental theorem of natural selection) [7, 14] . As follows from (11, 12) , for a ik (τ ) = a ki (τ ), Φ reduces to the averaged two-player contribution: Φ = αβp αāαβpβ . However, the theorem is not valid in the presence of the adaptive terms, and the mean fitness can decrease; see below.
Let us now study concrete examples. For n = 2, Eq. (2) simplifies to a closed equation for the frequency p 1
where without much loss of generality we adopted a 12 (τ ) = a 21 (τ ). Using notations (3) and defining
for the adaptive factor, we deduce from (7, 8, 13 )
C vanishes for the symmetric homozygotes, a 11 (τ ) = a 22 (τ ), and for one recessive allele, e.g. a 12 (τ ) = a 22 (τ ). Both cases are easily solvable from (13) showing that the long-time behavior of p 1 is indeed governed byĀ. (18) forā12 = 0.1,ā13 = 0.1, a23 = −0.1, κ1 = −0.65 and κ2 = 0.65;p1 andp2 are restricted by 0 ≤p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤p2 ≤ 1,p1 +p2 ≤ 1. Two fixed points are denoted by square (saddle) and cycle (center). The closed orbits contain the center in their interior; orbits from the second class converge top1 = 1. These two classes of orbits are separated by a dashed curve (separatrix), which is made by joining together two unstable directions of the saddle. Arrows indicate direction of flow.
The verticesp 1 = 1 andp 1 = 0 are always fixed points of (15), while two interior fixed points are
If π 1 and π 2 are in (0, 1), then π 1 (π 2 ) is stable (unstable). The analysis of (15) reduces to the following scenarios. 1. ForĀ > 0 andĀ >B [i.e.,ā 11 >ā 12 >ā 22 ] the morph 1 globally dominates for C = 0, i.e., for all initial conditionsp 1 goes to 1 for large times; see Fig. 1 . The global dominance does not change for C < 0. One can call this morph generalist [2] , since its fitness does not oscillate in time (ǫ k in (7) is zero forp 1 = 1), and its fitness is maximal; see also below. For
both π 1 and π 2 fall into the interval (0, 1), see Fig. 1 , while if one of conditions (17) does not hold, both π 1 and π 2 are not in this interval. Thus if (17) hold, a stable fixed point π 1 emerges, which attracts all the trajectories that start fromp 1 (0) < π 2 : the polymorphism is created by the adaptation term ∝ C in (15) . Initial condition larger than the unstable fixed point π 2 ,p 1 (0) > π 2 , still tend top 1 = 1; see Fig. 1 . Both stable fixed points π 1 and 1 are Evolutionary Stable States (ESS), meaning that they cannot be invaded by a sufficiently small mutant population [14] . The coexistence of two ESS one of which is interior (i.e., polymorphic) is impossible for a two-player replicator equation with constant pay-offs [14] , but it is possible for multi-player replicator equation [16] . We thus saw above an example of this behavior induced by time-varying environment.
As we discussed below (12) , the mean fitness does not contain the adaptive terms directly and is given as Φ = 2Āp 1 −Bp 2 1 (up to an irrelevant constant). ForĀ > 0 andĀ >B, Φ maximizes atp 1 = 1, and this maximum is the only stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics (15) with C = 0. If however C satisfies conditions (17) , in the stable fixed pointp 1 = π 1 the mean fitness Φ is smaller than at the stable pointp 1 = 1. Moreover, for the initial conditions π 1 <p 1 (0) < π 2 , the mean fitness Φ decreases in the course of the relaxation to π 1 .
The quantity which is increased by dynamics (15) is
Thus Ψ is the Lyapunov function:Ψ ≥ 0. Though Ψ − Φ < 0 whenever the adaptive polymorphism conditions (17) hold, the difference between the Lyapunov function and the mean fitness is not negative for C < 0.
Compare these facts to the evolution in a coarse-grained environment, which tends to maximize the average fitness minus a positive risk aversion factor; see [18] for reviews. 2. ForB >Ā > 0 [i.e.,ā 12 >ā 11 ,ā 22 ] and C = 0 there is a stable polymorphism at the fixed pointp 1 =Ā/B (heterozygote advantage). The presence of C = 0 in (15) does not change this polymorphism; only the value of the fixed point shifts to π 1 . In contrast to the scenario 1, here the response to slow environmental changes is reversible.
3. ForB <Ā < 0 and C = 0 there is an unstable polymorphism: all the initial conditions withp 1 (0) < A/B end up at p 1 = 0 (morph 2 dominates), while those with p 1 (0) >Ā/B finish at p 1 = 1 (morph 1 dominates). Now C = 0 in (15) shifts the unstable fixed point to π 2 .
These are all possible scenarios for n = 2; other relations betweenĀ andB lead to interchanging morphs.
For three morphs, n = 3, we assume the zero-sum situation in (2), a kl (τ ) = −a lk (τ ) [19] : the loss of the strategy l is equal to the gain of k. Equations (9-11) reduce toṗ
The four-party contribution disappears from (18) . One can show that any interior fixed point of (18) can be either saddle (two real eigenvalues of the Jacobian with different sign) or center (two imaginary, complex conjugate eigenvalues).
4. Forā 12 > 0,ā 13 > 0 and κ i = 0 the morph 1 globally dominates:p 1 = 1 is the only stable fixed point. For the existence of polymorphism it is necessary that κ 1 < 0, i.e., the strategies 2 and 3 together win over 1, although separately they lose to 1. The dominance of 1 is still kept whenp 2 orp 3 are forced to decay, because then the adaptive term in (18) is irrelevant for sufficiently large times. This happens whenā 23 < 0 and κ 2 < 0 or when a 23 > 0 and κ 3 < 0. Apart from these cases the terms ∝ κ i in (18) can lead to polymorphism, provided that their magnitude is large enough; see Fig. 2 . Besides the stable fixed pointp 1 = 1 of the κ i = 0 dynamics, two new fixed points emerge: stable (center) and unstable (saddle). A domain around the saddle supports polymorphism with cyclic dominance of the morphs; see Fig. 2 . We see a general feature of all the above examples: the adaptive (multi-party) terms do not influence the local stability of the vertices (where all but onep k 's are zero).
5. Forā 12 > 0,ā 13 < 0,ā 23 > 0 there is polymorphism already for κ i = 0: 1 wins over 2, which wins over 3, but 3 wins over 1 (rock-scissor-paper game). Now for κ i = 0 in (18) there is already one interior fixed point, and the trajectories are closed orbits around this fixed point. After including the adaptive (∝ κ k ) terms in (18) this fixed point is simply shifted, and no new fixed points appear for any size or magnitude of κ i .
To summarize, we have shown that in addition to the averaged payoffs, a fast [fine-grained] time-periodic environment generates adaptive, multi-player terms in the replicator dynamics, provided that at least two morphs react on the environment differently. These terms can create a polymorphic stable state via adaptation of the "weak" morphs to environmental changes. This polymorphism is related to decreasing mean fitness of the population. This specific aspect of the polymorphism was argued to be a prerequisite for the phenomenon of sympatric speciation, where by contrast to the allopatric scenario the speciation is induced inside a single population [20] . Thus, our results hint at a sympatric speciation scenario due to a fine-grained, time-periodic environment.
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